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Postmetaphysical Conundrums:
The Problematic Return to Metaphysics in
Horkheimer’s Critique of Instrumental Reason
George W. Shea, IV
Largely overshadowed by the renown of his colleagues Theodor W. Adorno,
Walter Benjamin, and Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer’s contributions to
the Frankfurt School are often downplayed as those of the mere director of the
Institute for Social Research and the lesser coauthor of Dialectic of Enlighten-
ment. Despite occupying this position of marginality within the corpus of Crit-
ical Theory, Horkheimer’s work stands as a significant and sustained attempt to
develop an interdisciplinary and materialist research program as a methodo-
logical alternative to metaphysical philosophy. As J. C. Berendzen notes, one
of Horkheimer’smost significant contributions to philosophy is his development
of materialism as a viable postmetaphysical critical social theory.1 Likewise,
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1. Berendzen, “Postmetaphysical Thinking or Refusal of Thought?” While Horkheimer himself
never used the term postmetaphysical to refer to his work or that of the Frankfurt School, instead gener-
ally referring to their philosophical orientation asmaterialism or Critical Theory, I regard Horkheimer as
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Hauke Brunkhorst lauds Horkheimer’s “materialist destruction of philoso-
phy” for opening theway to a “social-scientific transformation of philosophy”
that takes leave of the problems of metaphysical philosophy.2 Even with such
high praise for the strides his early work makes in establishing a tenable mate-
rialist, postmetaphysical philosophy, critics such as Georg Lohmann regard
Horkheimer’s later critique of instrumental reason as engaging in a totalizing
critique that undermines its own foundations, which raises once again the
question of the precise role metaphysics plays not only in Horkheimer’s work
but also in critique generally. In his essay “The Failure of Self-Realization: An
Interpretation of Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason,”3 written expressly for the
1993 collection of essays, On Max Horkheimer: New Perspectives—which
aimed to rectify the dearth of attention to Horkheimer’s work but is, however,
composed of critical essays in concert with Jürgen Habermas’s characteriza-
tion of the failures of Horkheimer’s Critical Theory4—Lohmann argues that
Horkheimer’s narration of the rise of instrumental reason presents the end of
metaphysics through an indictment of instrumental reason that must itself in
some way rest on a metaphysical foundation if it is to justify its denunciatory
claims. For Lohmann, this leaves Horkheimer in an untenable bind: either his
critique rests on a metaphysical basis and thereby refutes his very narration of
the rise of instrumental reason and the concomitant end of metaphysics, or
his critique is without basis and expresses little more than a whimsical resis-
tance to the surge of an increasingly rampant cultural nihilism. Either way, for
Lohmann, Horkheimer’s position is fraught with aporia.5
a member of a loose-knit cadre of thinkers who refuse the blackmail of metaphysics and seek viable the-
oretical alternatives. Though Horkheimer is self-avowedly a “materialist,” his attempt to construct an
interdisciplinary materialist research program that would serve as a coherent alternative to metaphysical
philosophy speaks to the larger issues that face postmetaphysical philosophies in general.
2. Brunkhorst, “Dialectical Positivism of Happiness.”
3. Lohmann, “Failure of Self-Realization” (hereafter cited as FSR). Since Lohmann’s essay is one
of the few in English to focus exclusively on Eclipse of Reason, it is a primary point of departure for
grappling with the complexities and challenges of this text.
4. This dearth continues, as only one major monograph on Horkheimer has appeared in English in
the past twenty-five years, John Abromeit’s Max Horkheimer and the Foundations of the Frankfurt
School, and there is equally a paucity of articles devoted to him. Thus a subsidiary aim of this article
is to treat Horkheimer’s work in its own right, insofar as it can contribute to our understanding of the
issues facing postmetaphysical philosophy in the present.
5. Lohmann’s argument here is reminiscent of the well-known critique Habermas in The Philosoph-
ical Discourse of Modernity levels atDialectic of Enlightenment, charging Horkheimer and Adornowith
advancing a critique of reason that undermines its own foundations, that is, a “totalizing critique of rea-
son.” However, Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason deserves to be regarded as distinct from Dialectic of
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While Lohmannstates that his overall aim in rereadingEclipseof Reason
is to undertake the magnanimous task of rescuing the “critical intent” at work in
it (FSR, 388), his reading fails to register a level of nuancevital to Horkheimer’s
argument. I contend that Horkheimer indeed grounds his indictment of instru-
mental reason in forms of truth and reason. However, since Horkheimer locates
the forms of truth and reason to which he appeals in the nature of nonidentity
thinking, he assumes that he has circumvented the trappings of metaphysical
philosophy. In this way, Horkheimer both anticipates and evades Lohmann’s
dilemma. Yet this evasion, I maintain, leaves Horkheimer no better situated,
as his position hypostasizes nonidentity thinking and in so doing establishes
itself as an antimetaphysical philosophy, which is, simply, another variant of
metaphysics. This conclusion though, in and of itself, still leaves us on thewell-
trod ground of Habermasian and post-Habermasian criticisms leveled against
the critique of instrumental reason. Thus I further argue that what is most sig-
nificant about Horkheimer’s establishment of ametaphysical philosophy in this
case is not that it merely stands as another instance of “totalizing critique” but,
more important, that it also violates the earlier methodological parameters he
established for his interdisciplinary materialism as a postmetaphysical philos-
ophy. This is disastrous for Horkheimer, since, as a materialist and postmeta-
physical philosopher, he is committed to the position that metaphysics is both
an obstacle to the alleviation of human suffering and an instrument of domina-
tion. By unwittingly lapsing intometaphysics, Horkheimer’s critique of instru-
mental reason succumbs to the very tyranny and domination it sought to obvi-
ate and undermines the original emancipatory purposes of hiswork. I aim to use
the foundering of Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason on an uninten-
tional lapse into metaphysical philosophy to signal the perils that lie in wait for
any postmetaphysical philosophy that fails to steer a clear path between the
antipodes of metaphysical and antimetaphysical positions.
I turn first to Horkheimer’s materialist essays of the 1930s in which he
sketches out his conception of, and objections to, metaphysics as well as how
his conception of an interdisciplinary materialism offers an alternative to the
transhistorical project of metaphysical philosophy. Next, I examine the place of
metaphysics in the critique of instrumental reason as it is elaborated in Eclipse
of Reason. I revisit Lohmann’s critique of Horkheimer to demonstrate that
through the hypostatization of nonidentity thinking, which he intends to serve
of instrumental reason, a solutionDialectic of Enlightenment only vaguely intimates. Second, and central
to this article, it ties the crisis of instrumental reason explicitly and directly to the project of Western meta-
physics, unlikeDialectic of Enlightenment.
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as a basis for the critique of instrumental reason, Horkheimer unwittingly estab-
lishes a transhistorical antimetaphysical philosophy that runs counter to his own
aims. Lastly, I articulate the manner inwhich this perilousmove calls on postme-
taphysical philosophies to renounce conventional metaphysical foundations—
both ontologically and normatively—if they are to avoid the incoherencies and
contradictions of antimetaphysical positions.
Interdisciplinary Materialism and Metaphysics
According to Horkheimer, metaphysics, as classically conceived, is concerned
with securing an absolutely perfect understanding of ultimate reality. Tradi-
tionally, this is understood in terms of the inquiring subject trying to discern
with perfect clarity the fundamentally unified and universal structure of reality
that underlies the totality of being. As a consequence, a central component of
metaphysical thinking, and the epistemological position that it assumes, is
the tendency to pursue an ideal correspondence between knowledge and the
known—or rather, an identity between the concept of the object and the object
of the concept. In this way, the knowledge of the knowing subject and the fun-
damental structure of reality should perfectly coincide.
More significantly, Horkheimer claims that metaphysicians engage in
the project of metaphysics not merely for its own sake but also out of a desire
to provide an absolutely certain foundation for normativity. As Horkheimer
notes:
The effort to make his personal life dependent at every point on insight into
the ultimate ground of things marks the metaphysician.6
Themetaphysician thus believes that, in the being he seeks to discover, a basis
may be found for shaping the individual’s life. . . . Ultimate reality is regarded
as normative, however, not only in those systems where religious origins of the
dependence relationship still show in the form which precept takes, but also in
all cases where harmony between the individual’s existence and its ground as
discovered by metaphysics is regarded as valuable. (MM, 18–19)
For Horkheimer, one of the hallmarks of metaphysical thinking is an attempt
to ground both ethics and a basis for normative critique in an understanding of
ultimate reality.
Horkheimer, however, has two objections to the project of metaphysics.
First, he claims that the task of trying to ascertain the fundamental structure of
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reality turns us away from the problems of this world and focuses us instead on
another, and quite possibly illusory, world. This, in effect, cultivates an insensi-
tivity to the wretchedness of the world and our time, and distracts us from seek-
ing its causes and altering its conditions. Rather than place a higher value on
changing the immediate and concrete material conditions of human existence
in thisworld, metaphysics relegates the social problems of thisworld to an infe-
rior position relative to the project of absolute knowing. Consequently, for
Horkheimer, the task of metaphysics by its very nature devalues human exis-
tence in favor of another world and thereby ignores the plight of humanity. Sec-
ond, and more important, Horkheimer claims that, under the guise of universal-
ity, metaphysical theories have been employed throughout history as a way to
justify the demand to recognize what are merely the particular interests of indi-
viduals and social groups. AsHorkheimer states: “Ruling and ruled classes alike
have not been satisfied to present their claims simply as expressions of their par-
ticular needs and desires. They have also proclaimed them as universally bind-
ing requirements grounded in transcendent sources, as principles in accord
with the eternal nature of the world and man” (MM, 22). In other words, social
classes are rarely content to present their specific needs as an expression of their
own personal agenda and instead often present those needs as universal and
binding laws of nature. For this reason, Horkheimer characterizes metaphysics
as an instrument of domination—that is, as a method for imposing one’s own
interests on others and for soliciting their obedience in the process of doing so.
Critically suspicious of the project of metaphysics, Horkheimer casts
doubt on thevery possibility of procuring a cognition of the eternal and unchang-
ing structure of ultimate reality, arguing that
the claim that there is an absolute order and an absolute demand made upon
man always supposes a claim to know the whole, the totality of things, the
infinite. But if our knowledge is in fact not yet final, if there is an irreducible
tension between concept and being, then no proposition can claim the dignity
of perfect knowledge. Knowledge of the infinite must itself be infinite, and a
knowledge which is admittedly imperfect is not a knowledge of the absolute.
(MM, 27)
For Horkheimer, the project of metaphysics problematically assumes an eter-
nal and unchanging structure of reality as well as a knowing subject that can,
through reason, transcend the particularities and specificities of space and
time to access this essential structure. In other words, Horkheimer understands
metaphysics as a transhistorical project aiming to secure what is unconditioned.
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However, such a project seems infeasible to Horkheimer. Neither nature nor the
subject appears to possess the immutability attributed to them by metaphysics.
Instead, advancing his interdisciplinary materialism as a methodological alter-
native to metaphysics, Horkheimer operates with a conception of the knowing
subject as deeply situated within its historical and material conditions and as
thereby constituted by those conditions.
The methodological difference between Horkheimer’s interdisciplinary
materialism and metaphysics is here worth emphasizing. Whereas metaphysi-
cal philosophies advance absolute and universal claims about both the knowing
subject and reality, the position advanced by an interdisciplinary materialism
concerning the knowing subject and reality is not regarded as claims about the
timeless and enduring nature of either but is instead explicitly held as hypothet-
ical and provisional principles postulated for understanding our historical
moment aswell as for guiding and orienting inquiry. The importance of under-
standing Horkheimer’s interdisciplinary materialism distinctly as a method, to
distinguish it from metaphysics, is similarly emphasized by Brunkhorst:
The other limit is the historicity of real subjects. Entirely in the sense of histor-
icism, the contingent historical horizon of the “respective concrete situation of
the actor” is an insuperable given for them. Everything is historically condi-
tioned. Nor is that meant as transcendental philosophy: it is only a refutable sup-
position, which has taken its leave of philosophy. Therefore . . . Horkheimer’s
materialism is essentially methodological materialism. It has a decidedly sci-
entistic streak. It accepts the distinction between “is” and “ought.” Fallibilistic
and oriented toward the sciences of experience, this materialism seeks to
expose its own hopes to disillusionment. Along with Dilthey, it regards meta-
physics as a mere hypothesis. It is a resolute attempt at a transformation of
philosophy into science but not simply in order to have the specialized disci-
plines step into the place of philosophy.Methodological materialism takes the
primacy of experience as its point of departure.7
There are two primary reasons for emphasizing thismethodological difference
between Horkheimer’s interdisciplinary materialism and metaphysics. The first
involves the potentially self-referential and ultimately contradictory nature of the
position Horkheimer must avoid. If he were to posit the historically conditioned
nature of both the knowing subject and the world as absolutes or as reflecting the
inherent and timeless nature of things, then his position would immediately lapse
into avariant of metaphysics—that is, Horkheimer’s interdisciplinarymaterialism
would be guilty of engaging in the very same transhistorical project of which
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he chargesmetaphysics andwould, of necessity, undermine itself.8 As his essays
from the 1930s demonstrate, Horkheimer takes considerable pains to distinguish
between his position and that of metaphysics. The second reason is that under-
standing Horkheimer’s interdisciplinary materialism as a method—as self-
reflexively hypothetical and provisional—similarly helps guard against the dog-
matic tendencies inherent in metaphysics, tendencies Horkheimer is explicitly
interested in avoiding. In this precise connection, Horkheimer notes, “Through-
out its historymaterialism has held to this theoryof knowledge [relying on sense
experience], which serves as a critical weapon against dogmatism” (MM, 42).
Thus the principles and concepts advanced by Horkheimer, if they are to refrain
from transforming into transhistorical and absolutist dogma, must maintain a
self-reflexively hypothetical and provisional status.
Given, however, that Horkheimer’s interdisciplinary materialism rejects
metaphysical absolutes for historically conditioned subjects and objects, it
would seem that his interdisciplinary materialism runs the risk of being little
more than either a form of skepticism or a form of relativism. If we cannot know
truth absolutely, or an absolute truth, then it would appear that we are unmoored
from any means by which to determine the validity of concepts. Yet, anticipat-
ing such criticisms, Horkheimer asks, “Is there really only a choice between
acceptance of a final truth, as proclaimed in religious and idealistic schools of
philosophy, and the view that every thesis and every theory is always merely
‘subjective,’ i.e., true and valid for a person or group or a time or human beings
as a species, but lacking objectivevalidity?”9 This dilemma, for Horkheimer, is
a false one. Explicitly rejecting both skepticism and relativism, Horkheimer
characterizes his interdisciplinary materialism as an alternative to both the
naivete of the metaphysics of truth and the absurdities of an academic, and rel-
ativistic, skepticism.
First, in Horkheimer’s estimation, G.W. F. Hegel satisfactorily addresses
philosophical skepticism via the notion of “determinate negation” (OPT, 184).
A skeptic would argue that because a series of concepts can never represent an
object accurately, the project of knowing is inherently flawed and ill-fated
from its very inception. Hegel, however, argues that the series itself is a process
of increasingly accurate depictions of the object and not a series of failures.
When an element of an object invalidates our concept of that object, we do not
simply abandon the concept tout court; the negation of the concept is not abso-
lute. In other words, a “determinate negation” is not a disjunction in which the
8. This is, in essence, what I argue occurs in Horkheimer’s later critique of instrumental reason.
9. Horkheimer, “On the Problem of Truth,” 183 (hereafter cited as OPT).
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book is on the shelf or the book is not on the shelf. Rather, the negation of the
concept is specific, playing a determinate part in the construction of the newcon-
cept.10 For Horkheimer, Hegel’s concept of “determinate negation” militates
against skepticism.
Yet, in Horkheimer’s estimation, we must move past Hegel, since he
remains caged within idealistic, dogmatic, and metaphysical philosophy. For
Hegel, “The goal is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial progres-
sion; it is the point where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself,
where knowledge finds itself, where Notion corresponds to object and object
to Notion.”11 In this way, according to Horkheimer, just as Kant’s theory of
knowledge succumbs to Hegel’s critique, so Hegel’s critique of Kant suc-
cumbs to Karl Marx’s:
[In] contemplating his own system, Hegel forgets one very definite side of the
empirical situation. The belief that this system is the completion of truth hides
from him the significance of the temporally conditioned interest which plays
a role in the details of the dialectical presentation through the direction of
thought, the choice of material content, and the use of names and words, and
diverts attention from the fact that his conscious and unconscious partisanship
in regard to the problems of life must necessarily have its effect as a constitu-
ent element of his philosophy. (OPT, 187)
In other words, Hegel disregards the historically conditioned character of
thought and succumbs to Marx’s claim that all thought is conditioned by its
time (OPT, 186).
Consequently, whereas Hegel advocates a closed dialectic that will one
day resolve itself in absolute knowing, Horkheimer advocates an open dialectic:
The open-ended materialistic dialectic does not regard the “rational” as com-
pleted at any point in history and does not expect to bring about the resolution
of contradictions and tensions, the end of the historic dynamic, by the full
development of mere ideas and their simple consequences. It lacks the aspect
of the idealistic dialectic that Hegel described as “speculative” and at the same
time as “mystical,” namely, the idea of knowing the ostensibly unconditioned
and thereby being oneself unconditioned. (OPT, 209–10)
10. Using the US 2012 presidential race as an example, the Republican Party avowedly had a poor
concept of the American voting constituency. This was manifested in the extreme disjunction between
the election results the party anticipated and the actual results. This discrepancy forced the Republican
Party to reexamine its initial concept. Although this concept is not negated absolutely, it is negated in a
significant way: the inadequacies in the original concept point toward a more adequate concept.
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Instead, for Horkheimer, “materialism . . . maintains the irreducible tension
between concept and object and thus has a critical weapon of defense against
belief in the infinity of the mind” (MM, 28).
Second, materialism’s rejection of a metaphysical absolute does not entail
that a measure for truth cannot be established and that it is therefore a form of
relativism. As in the sciences, generally accepted criteria—or, in Horkheimer’s
words, “availablemeansof cognition” (OPT, 192, 203)—are inplace at anygiven
time for determining the truth value of propositions. Horkheimer appeals to the
example of medicine. Thus we might say that while the concept of cancer may
change over time and eventually become meaningless as we currently under-
stand it, it has a precise meaning in our present, and only one of two conflicting
claims as to the presence of cancer in a patient will be correct. As Horkheimer
states, “Truth is decided not by individual’s beliefs and opinions, not by the sub-
ject in itself, but by the relation of the proposition to reality” (OPT, 194). In this
way, there is a generally accepted body of knowledge and a rigorous method
for establishing truth, and one either correctlyor incorrectlyappeals to and applies
these. “From this follows the principle that every insight is to be regarded as true
only in connection with the whole body of theory, and hence is so to be under-
stood conceptually that in its formulation the connection with the structural prin-
ciples and practical tendencies governing theory is preserved” (OPT, 204). In
other words, while on the particular level of specific instances of cancer, one either
diagnoses correctly or incorrectly; when the very concept of cancer is called into
question, this itself takes place in the greater context of a theoretical framework
and will have to resolve itself within this framework. Here Horkheimer is
accounting for what wemight today call a “paradigm shift”within a specific dis-
cipline12 or a discursive rupture.13 Concepts and theories can indeed be brought
into play that call into question the entire bodyof knowledge heretofore regarded
as established in a discipline—for example, the Einsteinian reframing of New-
tonian mechanics or our understanding of disease. Yet these debates themselves
take place in the context of a greater theoretical framework, in the context of
methods and aims that superseded and directed the very nature of those debates.
Quite clearly, Horkheimer is affirming a combination of the correspon-
dence theory of truth and a coherence theory of truth, holding these as staving
off the difficulties of skepticism and relativism.14 Yet, rather than naively
12. See Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
13. See Foucault, History of Madness, Birth of the Clinic, or Order of Things.
14. It is beyond the scope of this article to assess the intricacies of Horkheimer’s epistemology.
Rather, my aim is to highlight the fact that developing a nonmetaphysical epistemology was an explicit
component of Horkheimer’s interdisciplinary and materialist research program.
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thinking that either reaches the unconditioned, Horkheimer emphasizes the
historically conditioned character of the knower, her tasks, and what she seeks
to understand. Thus theory is always related to sociohistorical practice, even
those theories that, on the surface, appear most theoretically abstract. In this
way, while there is no “absolute knowing” for Horkheimer, not all claims to
truth are equally valid. Within the generally accepted parameters of knowl-
edge at a given time, there are criteria and methods for distinguishing true
claims from false claims, even if those claims once held true may one day prove
to be false from a refined and newly established understanding. So Horkheimer
can confidently claim:
Recognition of the conditional character of every isolated view and rejection
of its absolute claim to truth does not destroy this conditional knowledge;
rather, it is incorporated into the system of truth at any given time as a condi-
tional, one-sided, and isolated view. Through nothing but this continuous
delimitation and correction of partial truths, the process itself evolves its
proper content as knowledge of limited insights in their limits and connection.
(OPT, 184)
In this connection, we here return to the Frankfurt School’s Marxist
roots. For Horkheimer, what clearly distinguishes his interdisciplinary materi-
alism frommetaphysics, skepticism, relativism, or science is that it deliberately
aims to understand the current forms of social domination that arise under the
capitalist mode of production so as to change them. In other words, the “need
to comprehend contemporary society” calls for an “economic theory of soci-
ety” (MM, 45). Nor should this be understood in a narrow and reductive sense,
as Horkheimer’s interdisciplinary materialism has, since its inception, drawn
on psychoanalysis and empirical social research to understand “the connection
between the economic life of society, the psychical development of individuals,
and the changes in the realm of culture in the narrow sense.”15 Since the very
object of inquiry for an interdisciplinary materialism is highly mobile and
fluid—society is a multifaceted, complex, and dynamic phenomenon—an
interdisciplinary materialism must of necessity take into account not only the
fluidity of its object but also the necessity of remaining adaptable in its con-
cepts. As Horkheimer says elsewhere, “The various materialist doctrines,
therefore, are not examples of a stable and permanent idea” (MM, 45). Thus
an interdisciplinary materialism rejects transhistorical metaphysical theories
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of the unconditioned and opts instead for the mutability of understanding pro-
duced through an open dialectic. Stating the benefit of the open materialistic
dialectic, Horkheimer claims:
By ceasing to be a closed system, dialectic does not lose the stamp of truth. In
fact, the disclosure of conditional and one-sided aspects of others’ thought and
of one’s own constitutes an important part of the intellectual process. Hegel
and his materialist followers were correct in always stressing that this critical
and relativizing characteristic is a necessary part of cognition. But being cer-
tain of one’s own conviction and acting upon it donot require the assertion that
the concept and object are now one, and thought can rest. To the degree that
the knowledge gained from perception and inference, methodical inquiry and
historical events, daily work and political struggle, meets the test of the avail-
able means of cognition, it is the truth. The abstract proposition that once a
critique is justified from its own standpoint it will show itself open to correc-
tion expresses itself for the materialists not in liberality toward opposing
views or skeptical indecision, but in alertness to their own errors and flexibil-
ity in thought. (OPT, 191–92)
As should now be evident, an interdisciplinary materialism operates
wholly outside the confines of a project that occupies itself with securing the
unconditioned. Instead, Horkheimer’s interdisciplinary materialism abandons
the old paradigm of measuring its concepts against the ideal of absolute know-
ing: “Since that extra-historical and hence exaggerated concept of truth is
impossible, which stems from the idea of a pure infinite mind and thus in the
last analysis from the concept of God, it no longer makes sense to orient the
knowledge that we have to this impossibility and call it relative” (OPT, 192).
Rather, as noted above, an interdisciplinary materialism moves closer to the
methods and practices of science without reducing itself to them.16 Hence an
16. As Horkheimer himself notes: “The relationship between philosophical and corresponding spe-
cialized scientific disciplines cannot be conceived as though philosophy deals with the really decisive
problems—in the process constructing theories beyond the reachof the empirical sciences, its own con-
cepts of reality, and systems comprehending the totality—while on the other side empirical research
carries out its long, boring, individual studies that split up into a thousand partial questions, culminat-
ing in a chaos of countless enclaves of specialists. This conception—according to which the individual
researcher must view philosophy as a perhaps pleasant but scientifically fruitless enterprise (because not
subject to experimental control), while philosophers, by contrast, are emancipated from the individual
researcher because they think they cannot wait for the latter before announcing their wide-ranging
conclusions—is currently being supplanted by the idea of a continuous, dialectical penetration and
development of philosophical theory and specialized scientific praxis. . . . In short, the task is to do
what all true researchers have always done: namely to pursue their larger philosophical questions on
the basis of the most precise scientific methods, to revise and refine their questions in the course of
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interdisciplinary materialism uses concepts as hypotheses formulated on the
basis of the best and most rigorously accumulated knowledge at the time, but
it holds those concepts open to revision and continual scrutiny, guided always
by the concern to ameliorate the material and historical conditions of suffering
in contemporary society.17 As Brunkhorst characterizes it, “The most general
fundamental principles of the materialists—constitution-theoretical, even
ontological-sounding theses such that ‘all that exists is material’—have a
merely hypothetical status, dependent of fallible experience.”18 Again, this is
not to suggest a retreat into either relativism or nihilism. Rather, it is an attempt
to advance a method for determining the most adequate theory of the current
historical condition while remaining open to the dynamic nature of the objects
of inquiry and the requirement to remain flexible in the need to adjust theory.
Unlike metaphysical philosophies, which take themselves to be the one and
only true form of inquiry, interdisciplinary materialism employs the open dia-
lectic to remain vigilant against dogmatismwhile remaining open to amending
its conceptual formulations.
Even more significant, since an interdisciplinary materialism indeed
operates outside the confines of the traditional project of metaphysics, it also
therefore rejects the notion of a metaphysically grounded normative position of
action or critique. Horkheimer further elaborates this position in his essay
“Materialism and Morality.” There he again casts metaphysics as concerned
with securing absolutemoral principles: “As distinctive as the systems of Leib-
niz, Spinoza, and the Enlightenment may be, they all bear the marks of an
effort to use the eternal constitution of the world and of the individual as the
basis for establishing some determinate manner of conduct as being appropri-
ate for all time. They therefore make a claim to unconditional validity.”19 He
similarly rejects such attempts: “Morality does not admit of any grounding—
neither by means of intuition nor of argument.”20 Instead, under Horkheimer’s
conception, an interdisciplinary materialism aims to reveal and understand
how moral systems reflect the sociohistorical conditions from which they
arise. For Horkheimer, “Materialism sees in morality an expression of life of
determinate individuals and seeks to understand it in terms of the conditions of
their substantivework, and to developnewmethodswithout losing sight of the larger context” (“Present
Situation of Social Philosophy,” 8–9).
17. The latter aim marks one of the fundamental differences later for Horkheimer between tradi-
tional and Critical Theory. See “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 198–99 (hereafter cited as TCT).
18. Brunkhorst, “Dialectical Positivism of Happiness,” 77.
19. Horkheimer, “Materialism and Morality,” 16.
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its emergence and passing, not for the sake of truth in itself but rather in con-
nectionwith determinate historical forces.”21 Horkheimer aims to demonstrate
how the Kantian moral system, with its emphasis on a disinterested accord
with duty, reflects economic and social relations under capitalism. Signifi-
cantly, however, he is quite clear that his interdisciplinary materialism bars
methodologically the possibilityof providing an absolute foundation for moral-
ity itself. Horkheimer openly admits that an interdisciplinary materialism is
without a traditional ground for its moral and normative position: “This mate-
rialist view has the negative significance that it rejects a metaphysically
grounded morality” (MM, 44). Nonetheless, an interdisciplinary materialism
is not a form of quietism: “It has always meant to materialists that man’s striv-
ing for happiness is to be recognized as a natural fact requiring no justification”
(MM, 44). At its core, interdisciplinary materialism, then, refuses to postpone
changing this world in favor of theorizing about another. And, in keeping with
the historically conditioned character of both subjects and objects, Horkheimer
further contends:
Politics in accord with this goal [the ideals of freedom, equality, and justice]
therefore must not abandon these demands, but realize them—not, however,
by clinging in a utopian manner to definitions which are historically condi-
tioned, but in accordance with their meaning. The content of the ideas is not
eternal, but is subject to historical change—surely not because “Spirit” of
itself capriciously infringes upon the principle of identity, but because human
impulses which demand something better take different forms according to
the historical material with which they have to work.
Again, the guiding aim of an interdisciplinary materialism is to alter the mate-
rial conditions of this world in which people suffer and to develop a theoretical
position that can most effectively realize this aim.More precisely, we find since
at least the start of the twentieth century a disproportionate amount of suffer-
ing that is due to a deficiency neither in resources nor in technology, since both
exist in such abundance as to provide a reasonable quality of life for all. Rather,
for Horkheimer, the current state of inequality and barbarism is the result of
our economic situation, with capitalism as the dominant mode of production.
The goal for an interdisciplinary materialism is to develop a theory of society
that ameliorates the suffering of the majority of people in thisworld rather than
finding a reason to do so in another. In the words of John Abromeit, “Critical
21. Horkheimer, “Materialism and Morality,” 32.
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Theory is ultimately driven by the interests of concrete individuals in a better
life, not by its own perfect knowledge of the social totality or privileged insight
into a utopian blueprint of a better society.”22 Significantly, then, rather than
attempt to gain an insight into the ultimate nature of reality, interdisciplinary
materialists aim to formulate dialectical conceptions of sociohistorical forma-
tions so that they can direct those formations toward the fulfillment of human
satisfaction.
From an Interdisciplinary Materialism to the Critique
of Instrumental Reason
As previously mentioned, Horkheimer’s interdisciplinary materialism has
“society itself as its object” (TCT, 206). However, it is society not as a disinter-
ested object of contemplation but as an object of deep concern born out of a
vested interest in establishing “a rationally organized future society” for “rad-
ically improving human existence” (TCT, 233). This self-reflexive interest in
transforming the object of its inquiry, as opposed to a purported impartiality,
is a distinguishing characteristic, for Horkheimer, between Critical Theory and
traditional theory—between, respectively, Horkheimer’s own interdisciplinary
materialism and those theoretical approaches from which he differentiates it.
In essence, traditional theory stands as the culmination of themetaphysical and
epistemic ideals of early modernity that privilege the model of an abstract and
disembodied knowing subject underpinning a systematic, unified, and com-
prehensive theoretical totality and provides the basis for a universal and com-
plete science of all possible objects. At issue in the difference between the two
approaches to theory, for Horkheimer, is the relationship between theory and
praxis.23 According to Horkheimer, the abstract and disembodied epistemic
subject of traditional theory comes to represent the subject itself and, in doing
so, valorizes and produces an apolitical and individualized monadic social sub-
ject. On this basis, Horkheimer argues that “traditional theory” is responsible
for constructing and disseminating a conception of the subject as an autono-
mous and disinterested spectator, whose interests are unaffected by the condi-
tions in which the subject finds itself. Thus the abstract knowing subject, con-
cretized in the formof the Cartesian subject, metastasizes into amonadic social
entity untouched by the exigencies of social life, which propagates an image of
the subject as the ground of its own values and not as a product of sociohistor-
ical forces. In this way, the monadic individual operates with a “distorted”
22. Abromeit,Max Horkheimer, 329.
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sense of freedom and autonomy, since it identifies with itself as an abstract
rather than as a historical and material entity and fails to recognize itself as
the product of, and an agent of, social change, which results in the abdication
of its responsibility for producing the very conditions of its social existence. In
distinction to traditional theory, Critical Theory fully embraces the dialectical
character of both its historically andmaterially conditionedmotivations aswell
as its objects of inquiry and their conceptual formulations. In this way, Critical
Theory serves self-reflexively as a transformative activity that brings together
both theory and praxis.
By the 1940s, however, guided by a lifelong commitment to identifying
the causes of suffering and working toward mitigating their effects,24 and hav-
ing identified the hypostatized knowing subject as the cause of the socially dis-
engaged monadic subject, Horkheimer turns to tracing the historical origins of
what he elsewhere calls the “Cartesian-empiricist philosophy of conscious-
ness.”25 Since Horkheimer’s interdisciplinary materialism begins with the prin-
ciple that all thinking is historically and materially conditioned, the critique of
instrumental reason is not a complete break in critical method, or even a total
shift in critical object, but a continued development of the critique of the meta-
physical and epistemic subject of traditional theory carried out under the ear-
lier aegis of “Critical Theory.”26 Having identified the schematic form of the
ills of our time—a socially disengaged monadic subject—a diagnostic task of
Horkheimer’s middle period becomes to trace the conditions of this form of
subjectivity back to its genesis so that the causes of suffering in our own time
might be corrected and an alternative path for humanity might be identified.27
Dialectic of Enlightenment, written with Adorno, partly undertakes this
task. However, whileDialectic of Enlightenment indeed focuses on a historical
analysis of the origin and rise of themodern scientificattitude—culminating in
24. A defining aim of Horkheimer’s oeuvre is to identify the sources of suffering in the contempo-
rary world so as to alleviate them. This motif is present in Horkheimer’s earliest writing,Dämmerung,
and continues up until his last essays, such as “Threats to Freedom” and “The Future of Marriage.”
25. Horkheimer, “Rationalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy,” 220.
26. Martin Jay argues that Horkheimer’s “Beginnings of the Bourgeois Philosophyof History” is a
paradigmatic example of this continuity in the oeuvre of Horkheimer (Dialectical Imagination, 257).
27. My aim here is not to contest the established shift that occurs in Horkheimer’s thought from the
1930s to the 1940s but simply to note that the metaphysical and epistemic subject of early modernity
remained an abiding concern of Horkheimer’s even if treated in varied forms. The personal, intellec-
tual, and social factors contributing to the shifts in Horkheimer’s thinking, as well as that of the other
members of the Frankfurt School, are too numerous to mention here. For accounts of these shifts, see
the excellent works by Abromeit, Susan Buck-Morss, Helmut Dubiel, Martin Jay, Stuart Jefferies,
Peter M. R. Stirk, and Rolf Wiggershaus.
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the instrumentalization of reason—and holds out the vague hope for a form of
reason that is “other” to it, its analyses remain hastily sketched and only par-
tially developed, and an explicit discussion of the relationship between meta-
physics and instrumental reason is conspicuously missing. In contrast, Eclipse
of Reason provides a much fuller and richer historical account of the rise of
instrumental reason, there termed subjective reason. While Horkheimer’s
account of the evolution of Western reason in Eclipse of Reason continues to
locate the birth of reason in the drive to self-preservation and the reciprocal
impulse to dominate nature, its history now passes through metaphysics. On
this account, Western reason finds its first expression in myth, transforms
into metaphysics, and ends in science. The significance here is worth noting.
Whereas Horkheimer had formerly been quite careful to characterize his inter-
disciplinary materialism as an alternative tometaphysics and not as refutation
of metaphysics, thereby steering clear of the question of the end of metaphys-
ics, here in Eclipse of ReasonHorkheimer announces the destruction of West-
ern metaphysics, since, on his account, metaphysics as a speculative enterprise
harbors the elements of its owndemise at the hands of the empirical sciences to
which it gives rise. Thus Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason funda-
mentally precludes an appeal tometaphysics as an antidote towhat he considers
the tyrannical reign of subjective reason.
The Place of Metaphysics in Horkheimer’s Critique
of Instrumental Reason
In no uncertain terms, Horkheimer states that the purpose of Eclipseof Reason
is “to inquire into the concept of rationality that underlies our contemporary
industrial culture in order to discover whether this concept does not contain
defects that vitiate it essentially.”28 The concept of reason that concerns Hork-
heimer here is what he identifies as subjective reason. In its subjective form,
reason functions merely as a formal mechanism of classification, inference, and
deduction, and, more important, its operations lie entirely in determining and
coordinating the most efficient means for already established ends. However,
this entails that subjective reason alone is incapable of evaluating the suitability
and worth of ends themselves. Instead, this task falls to reason in its objective
form. Originating in Greek antiquity as the project of metaphysics, objective
reason aims to access and disclose the rational order inherent in the universe
that exists independently of individual subjects and provides the measure for
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assessing the reasonableness of one’s life and actions, which is typically formu-
lated in terms of either a harmony or discord between one’s life and that order.
Since objective reason claims absolute authority over proclamations
about the ultimate nature of reality, it exists in tensionwith mythology and reli-
gion, both of which equally make assertions about the eternal order of things
and our place within it. Despite this tension, objective reason—as it was resur-
rected in the Renaissance, developed in the Scientific Revolution, and culmi-
nated in the ideals of the Enlightenment—won out over myth and religion as
the legitimate source of knowledge and therefore of authority. Yet in the end
this victory served only as a step toward objective reason’s own destruction. As
formalized science progressed, it in turn came to be regarded as having estab-
lished the singular method for determining truth. Just as objective reason
dethroned religion by casting it as irrational myth, so science dethroned meta-
physics by casting it as nothing more than idle speculation, and in doing so
unmoored human enterprise from an objective foundation. In this connection,
Horkheimer notes:
The philosophers of the Enlightenment attacked religion in the name of rea-
son; in the end what they killed was not the church but metaphysics and the
objective concept of reason itself, the source of power of their own efforts.
Reason as an organ for perceiving the true nature of reality and determining
the guiding principles of our lives has come to be regarded as obsolete. Spec-
ulation is synonymous with metaphysics, and metaphysics with mythology
and superstition. We might say that the history of reason or enlightenment
from its beginnings in Greece down to the present has led to a state of affairs
in which even the word reason is suspected of connoting some mythological
entity. Reason has liquidated itself as an agency of ethical, moral, and reli-
gious insight. (ER, 18)
In other words, with the rise of scientism during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, subjective reason comes to supplant objective reason, culminating in
a crisis of reason—leaving us without a mechanism by which to determine
objectively the suitability of ends themselves. Instead, the determination of
goals and values now depends on something other than reason; they become
a matter of mere predilection.
What is worse, according to Horkheimer, is that the crisis of reason not
only leaves us without a guiding normative principle but also thereby precipi-
tates a tide of global conformity and an accompanying loss of individuality,
since, without an objective orientation for thought, reason now serves in its
subjective form as a mechanism of adaptation. Now that reason is no longer
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capable of putting forward ideals by which individuals might change the
world, instead it operates only in the service of those that have already been
established. Moreover, in this situation, self-preservation stands as the only
immediately obvious end worth pursuing. When this pursuit is coupled with a
socioeconomic environment governed entirely by the logic of profit, the only
means of survival available to individuals is to make themselves “useful”
within it. Once subjective reason takes hold of economic profit as its exclusive
end, individuals engage in totalizing calculations aimed at transforming them-
selves into economically useful agents. The effect causes individuals to aban-
don the pursuit of their own self-interest as well as the hope of any form of
self-realization other than as subjects of capitalism.
For Horkheimer, this means that individuals no longer realistically con-
sider ways of living that will not in the end produce a “return on investment.”
We donot seriously consider spending our lives cycling around theworld, since
this is useful to no one. We do not regard an education as an opportunity to
transform ourselves into “better” people capable of more fulfilling lives, since
wevieweducation merely as providing the qualifications necessary for appear-
ing employable. If we engage in aesthetic production, the quality of our work is
assessed in terms of its salability and not according to some other criteria—just
like our lives. Moreover, we are almost certain to wear fashionable clothes, lis-
ten to popular music, and watch popular television programs and movies to
appear relatively normal, since, in deviating from the norm, we run the risk
of exclusion, and those who are excluded diminish their chances of survival.29
Ultimately, we adapt to the socioeconomic environment in which we find our-
selves, which is accomplished by demonstrating our worth in the marketplace,
and the manufacturing of this utility and profitability comes at the cost of hav-
ing to sacrifice ourselves.
There is a real absurdity and contradiction in this situation for Horkheimer.
The very form of reason that was supposed to liberate us from domination and
oppression has rebounded to create a condition in which we abandon the pursuit
of our own self-interests and self-realization to make ourselves into something
“useful” for the production of profit, which is itself directed and determined by
the unfettered whims of the free market. In this way, reason now serves as a
mechanism that adapts us to the economy of irrationality that governs our lives.
29. The themes of normalization and exclusion are elaborated previously by Horkheimer and
Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment: “Anyone who does not conform is condemned to an economic
impotence which is prolonged in the intellectual powerlessness of the eccentric loner. Disconnected
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For Horkheimer, we find that the Marquis de Sade’s imprisoned pleasures have
installed themselves as our social nightmare:
It may be just asmeaningless to call one particular way of living, one religion,
one philosophy better or higher or truer than another. Since ends are no longer
determined in the light of reason, it is also impossible to say that one economic
or political system, no matter how cruel and despotic, is less reasonable than
another. According to formalized reason, despotism, cruelty, oppression are
not bad in themselves; no rational agency would endorse a verdict against dic-
tatorship if its sponsors were likely to profit by it. (ER, 31–32)
At the heart of the problem, for Horkheimer, is thevery project of reason itself,
which has always aimed at establishing human security and fulfillment through
the domination of nature. This project culminates early on in the great meta-
physical systems of Western history that valorize the knowing subject as an
abstract ego distinct and separate from the external world that it seeks to
understand for the purposes of mastering and controlling it. Whether it is the
Platonic tripartite soul, the Thomistic eternal soul, the free Cartesian ego, the
Kantian transcendental ego, or Hegelian Absolute Spirit, all of metaphysics
assumes an abstract ego that distances itself from everything alien to it—
impulses, desires, the body, and the world—so as to dominate and subjugate
it all the more thoroughly. According to Horkheimer:
It is instructive to followDescartes’ efforts to find a place for this ego, which is
not in nature but remains close enough to nature to influence it. Its first con-
cern is to dominate the passions, that is, nature, so far as it makes itself felt in
us. The ego is indulgent to agreeable andwholesome emotions but is sternwith
any conducive to sadness. Its central concern must be to keep the emotions
from biasing judgments. Mathematics, crystal-clear, imperturbable, and
self-sufficient, the classical instrument of formalized reason, best exemplifies
the workings of this austere agency. The ego dominates nature. (ER, 107)
For Horkheimer, the history of metaphysics, as the history of the abstract ego,
is the story of the history of the domination of nature both within and without
the subject, since to guarantee the purity of its conceptualizations, which are
necessary for dominating nature without, the subject, as the ego, must domi-
nate the corrupting influences of nature—as desire, instinct, and passion—
within. Thus the very project of the domination of nature has always necessar-
ily included the project of the domination of humanity (ER, 105). Yet the proj-
ect of the domination of nature has not always entailed the total sacrifice and
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liquidation of the individual. In its earliest formations among the ancient
Greeks, the project of metaphysics required certain sacrifices on the part of the
subject, certain forms of self-control and self-restraint, but they were thought to
be in accordwith an order that enriched the polis and thereby secured the auton-
omy and realization of the self (ER, 131). However, now that metaphysics has
come to an end, there is no objective order to which we might work to conform
in hopes of achieving greater autonomy. Instead, we sacrifice ourselves so as to
adapt to the world as it is only in the hope that we maymerely survive. The proj-
ect of dominating nature and realizing human autonomy, which required the
domination of the self by the self, has resulted in the total liquidation of the
self. Thus Horkheimer concludes, “The theme of this time is self-preservation,
while there is no self to preserve” (ER, 128).
Despite the dire tone of his analyses, Horkheimer remarks, “The disease
of reason is that reason was born from man’s urge to dominate nature, and the
‘recovery’ depends on insight into the nature of the original disease, not on a
cure of the latest symptoms” (ER, 176). In other words, for Horkheimer, all is
not lost. Indeed, the very aim of philosophical thinking, on his account, is “to
essay a reconciliation” of the antagonismbetween reason and nature that reason
has either forgotten or denies exists (ER, 162). This means developing some-
thing other than the metaphysical conception of nature in which this antago-
nism has manifested itself. At the core of metaphysics, for Horkheimer, is the
logic of identity—the attempt to fashion all-encompassing and totalizing con-
cepts from which nothing can escape and for which there is no remainder (ER,
169). As noted above, the epistemic ideal of metaphysical concepts is a perfect
equivalence between concept and object. However, these metaphysical con-
cepts presuppose both transhistorical unities that exist independently of the
historical contingencies of space and time, and a knowing subject that can over-
come those historical contingencies so as to access them. In thisway, the meta-
physical impulse, which employs the logic of identity, of necessity gives rise to
the ideal of an abstract ego that can extricate itself from nature, both within
andwithout, and conceptualize nature accurately. At bottom, the metaphysical
impulse pits the abstract ego, as the locus of reason, against nature as if they
were two distinct yet somehow related entities. However, for Horkheimer, a
real reconciliation between reason and nature via a nonmetaphysical paradigm
must take care neither to perpetuate the illusory separation of the two nor to
force a false unity between them. As for false unities, Horkheimer has in
mind both crude materialist theories that reduce “spirit” to operations of mat-
ter as well as idealistic theories that reduce the material world to a manifesta-
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within the logic of identity, since they are equally driven by the metaphysical
impulse to dominate nature in that they attempt to reduce the one to the other
and perpetuate the domination of humanity.
Consequently, for Horkheimer, reconciling the antagonism between rea-
son and nature requires dispensing with not only metaphysics and its logic of
identity but also the very impulse to dominate nature that gives rise to meta-
physics. Moving toward a solution, he claims:
Reason can realize its reasonableness only through reflecting on the disease of
the world as produced and reproduced by man; in such self-critique, reason
will at the same time remain faithful to itself, by preserving and applying for
no ulterior motive the principle of truth that we owe to reason alone. The sub-
jugation of nature will revert to subjugation of man, and vice versa, as long as
man does not understand his own reason and the basic process by which he
has created and is maintaining the antagonism that is about to destroy him.
Reason can bemore than nature only through concretely realizing its “natural-
ness”—which consists in its trend to domination—the very trend that para-
doxically alienates it from nature. Thus also, by being the instrument of rec-
onciliation, it will be more than an instrument. (ER, 177)30
In effect, Horkheimer claims that to overcome the crisis of reason that he
has diagnosed, reason must recognize its own “naturalness”—the impulse to
domination—at work in its construction of the dualism between the abstract
ego and nature (ER, 177). In this way, if the impulse to dominate nature is at
the heart of reason’s invention of an abstract ego that stands outside and above
nature—as the corrupting impulses that would contaminate absolute knowl-
edge of transhistorical truths reflecting the structure of nature—then reason
must recognize its origin in and relation to nature to check this impulse. Once
reason recognizes the metaphysical impulse as a manifestation of the will to
dominate nature—and that the metaphysical impulse is itself a manifestation
of nature—it can begin to formulate a nonmetaphysical understanding of
nature that neither reinscribes the dualism between reason and nature nor
reduces the one to the other but that is instead adequate to the complex inter-
relation between them.
Abandoning metaphysics and the logic of identity as possible correctives
to the current forms of domination and oppression, since they are born from the
will to dominate, Horkheimer envisions as an alternative task for philosophy
30. Horkheimer defines the principle of truth, towhich he appeals a few pages later, as “the adequa-
tion of name and thing” (ER, 180).
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the process of a twofold negation. First, philosophy should expose the histori-
cal relativity of metaphysical systems that present their principles as ultimate
and eternal truths. And second, it should measure a culture’s basic ideas and
values against the social reality to which they belong so as to assess the breach
between them. While ideals such as justice, equality, and freedom are evacu-
ated of their timeless metaphysical content, philosophy can gauge the disso-
nance operative between social reality and the ideals that a culture professes
to valorize in order to close the distance between them. Philosophy, through
negation, can not only remove impediments to the development of humanity,
which is, for Horkheimer, a step toward a more robust freedom and individu-
ality for humanity, but also act as a corrective to history and, in his ownwords,
“help to keep the course of humanity from resembling the meaningless round
of the asylum inmate’s recreation hour” (ER, 186).
ACrisis of Critique in Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason
Sympathetic with Horkheimer’s analyses, Lohmann is explicit that Hork-
heimer’s intent to locate the “negativity of instrumental reason” in the “phe-
nomena of failed self-realization” remains significant for understanding and
appreciating the impetus to engage in a critique of instrumental reason at all.
Yet, even though this critical intent is worth preserving, Horkheimer’s critique
itself runs aground in irresolvable contradictions for Lohmann. Lohmann
claims that “since it could not develop another, positive concept of reason, the
critique of instrumental reason could not be certain of its own activity and, in
the end, became entangled in ambiguities and aporetic justifications” (FSR,
388). In reconstructing the central argument of Horkheimer’s text, Lohmann
emphasizes that Horkheimer’s analysis of the crisis of reason undermines
any foundational position from which one could indict or resist the collapse
of reason. On Lohmann’s account, Horkheimer’s critique of reason either
remains merely at the level of the programmatic or succumbs to historical rel-
ativism, since it fails to secure an adequate foundation for critique. In Loh-
mann’s own terms, Horkheimer’s analysis needs a “comprehensive concept
of reason” through which the critique of reason can be justified. However,
since Horkheimer’s history of the crisis of reason tells the story of the rise of
subjective reason as calculating instrumentality—and its overthrow of an objec-
tive formof reason that could securemetaphysical foundations—critique therein
loses any basis onwhich to rest truth claims, which Lohmann regards as essen-
tial for any project of critique. Thus Horkheimer’s critique of subjective rea-
son must be relativistic, since, on his own admission, there is no form of abso-
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demonstration that the instrumental reason of subjective self-preservation ulti-
mately destroys the individual whose self-realization it originally aimed to
promote is . . . denunciatory. Yet this finding yields no objectively justifiable
alternative. It shows only that these approaches do not work” (FSR, 406). In
the end, according to Lohmann, Horkheimer is left only with a vague appeal
to a form of reason that is “other” to the one born of the metaphysical impulse
to dominate nature and not a substantial basis on which to decry philosophi-
cally the instrumentalization of reason. To this extent, Lohmann’s analysis of
the critique of instrumental reason in Eclipse of Reason charges Horkheimer
with engaging in a totalizing critique of reason that undermines its own foun-
dations and falls prey to contradiction.
Lohmann’s reading of Eclipse of Reason, however, rests entirely on an
understanding of critique in its metaphysical form—whereby false absolutes
are unmasked via an appeal to a foundational truth, and practices that deviate
from an understanding of that truth are denounced as aberrant, immoral, and
unjust. Employing this conception of critique, Lohmann cannot help but find
Horkheimer’s text enigmatic. As Lohmann sees it, Horkheimer’s analysis of
instrumental reason purports to trace the destruction of any position from
which one could launch critique, yet somehow presses forward in the very
attempt to critique this situation. For Lohmann, Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Rea-
son is at best nonsensical and at worst rife with contradiction. Based on this
understanding of critique, Lohmann deems a “programmatic” reading of Hork-
heimer’s critique untenable, since such a reading cannot secure the validity of
its claims and hence lacks any “force” or “bite” in its analyses. Yet Horkheimer’s
interdisciplinary materialism, as shown above, was distinctly programmatic in
this way. As an avowed methodological alternative to metaphysical philoso-
phy, it is an explicit tenet of an interdisciplinary materialism that the aim of
alleviating human suffering is an end that requires no further justification
and that an interdisciplinary materialism itself serves only as a dialectical
approach to historically specific cultural constructions. For this reason, an
interdisciplinary materialism stands as an exemplary postmetaphysical phi-
losophy, since its ends and approach are not purported to reflect a transhistor-
ical understanding of the ultimate nature of reality but are instead operating
principles of inquiry and action resulting from a considered methodological
decision—in other words, neither purport to reflect timeless, universal truths.
Thus Lohmann’s indictment of Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason
for its possible programmatic nature is not in and of itself a refutation of it.31
31. Or one might say that the “programmatic” nature of a theory could be regarded as its refutation
only by those who presuppose metaphysics to be the sole proper method for philosophy and critique.
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To the contrary, its programmatic nature is precisely what is most laudable in
Horkheimer’s elaboration of an interdisciplinary materialism as a postmeta-
physical methodology.
If Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason were elaborated pro-
grammatically in the same manner as his interdisciplinary materialism, this
would, despite Lohmann’s claims to the contrary, be a real boon for his analy-
ses. However, Lohmann’s sense that Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental rea-
son presents something more than just a programmatic analysis, that a meta-
physical specter looms at its core, is not entirely unfounded. Indeed, Horkheimer
is not content simply to denounce the effects of instrumentalized reason: he
grounds his critique in the failures of reason itself. Thuswe find Horkheimer con-
demning reason not just for its undesirable outcomes in the forms of instrumental-
ized reason and the liquidation of the self but also for thevery formof subjectivity
towhich it gives rise—namely, an abstract ego that exists as the site of reason and
in an antagonistic relation to nature. Central to Horkheimer’s analysis of the crisis
of reason is the position that the antagonismbetween the abstract ego and nature is
a false dichotomy. Unifying myth, metaphysics, and science is the impulse to
dominatenature, and it ishere, in the impulse to dominatenature, thatHorkheimer
locates reason’s invention of the division between the abstract ego, as the knowing
subject, over and against nature as what is to be conceptualized and schematized
for the purposes of being controlled.Rejecting themetaphysicsof the abstract ego
as the site of an illusion, Horkheimer claims that “the formalistic method of defi-
nition proves particularly inadequatewhen applied to the concept of nature. For to
define nature and its complement, spirit, is inevitably to pose either their dualism
or their unity, and to pose the one or the other as anultimate, a‘fact,’while in truth
these two fundamental philosophical categories are inextricably interconnected”
(ER, 169). Moreover, if at the core of abstract conceptualizations is the logic of
identity—the metaphysical ideal of all-embracing and totalizing epistemic con-
ceptualizations that achieve a perfect equivalence between concept and object,
and which presuppose the existence of transhistorical unities that exist indepen-
dently of the historical contingencies of space and time as well as a knowing sub-
ject that can overcome those contingencies to access them—then, according to
Horkheimer, we need to effect a reconciliation between reason and nature via a
new form of nonidentity thinking, one that no longer perpetuates the illusory sep-
aration of reason and nature due to its impulse to dominate nature.
However, if we recall Horkheimer’s earlier objections to metaphysics, he precisely denounced meta-
physics as a political instrument for imposing particular interests on other groups under the guise of a
binding universality. As a postmetaphysical thinker, Horkheimer would explicitly reject the very form
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In essence, by tracing our modern form of scientific thinking back to its
historical origins, Horkheimer claims to have disclosed the aberrant moment in
history, in thinking, at which reason derailed from its emancipatory potential—
namely, at the moment of a corrupting invention that falsely created a division
between the abstract ego and nature as its antagonist. In this way, in Eclipse of
Reason, Horkheimer can confidently advocate nonidentity thinking as the cor-
rective to our modern barbarism—which is only intimated at in Dialectic of
Enlightenment. However, as Lohmann points out, if this is the case, “then the
denunciatory version of the self-criticism of reason has . . . passed over into
the attempt to recover a comprehensive concept of reason.” So “the ‘basic dif-
ference between the ideal and the real’ characteristic of this ‘true philosophy’
is at the same time a relapse into metaphysics” (FSR, 407). For Lohmann,
Horkheimer’s appeal to a foundational conception of truth, and thus a com-
prehensive concept of reason, means that Horkheimer is squarely engaged in
metaphysics. However, for Lohmann, this leaves Horkheimer in an irresolv-
able contradiction, since, in regard to metaphysics, he states explicitly that
“the classical systems of objective reason, such as Platonism, seem to be unten-
able because they are glorifications of an inexorable order of the universe and
therefore mythological” (ER, 180). In other words, Horkheimer appears both
to reject metaphysics and to appeal to a foundational conception of truth that
has metaphysical implications, and thus runs aground in aporia.
Horkheimer’s position is, however, more nuanced than Lohmann pre-
sents it. The tension at work in Horkheimer’s critique is not a blatant contradic-
tion but a category mistake. Since Horkheimer narrowly equates metaphysics
with identity thinking, he considers a disclosure of the nonidentical at the heart
of a more authentic reason to be something “other” than metaphysics. How-
ever, even though the open and nontotalizing character of nonidentity thinking
is, on the surface, different from the closed and total character of identity think-
ing, it serves in Horkheimer’s final thought the very same function he had ear-
lier in his career attributed to metaphysical philosophy—namely, as an insight
into the transhistorical, universal, and essential structure of reality onwhich to
establish the normative foundations for one’s life, even if in this case the insight
reveals nonidentity rather than identity. Here, we can delineate the difference
between identity and nonidentity thinking in the difference between what I
would term centripetal and centrifugal metaphysics. Whereas a centripetal
metaphysics, which Horkheimer rejects, would aim to wash away historical
contingency and difference to reveal an indissoluble identity that would in
some way return us to the privileged perspective of a metaphysical center, a
centrifugal metaphysics would alternatively aim to disclose the fundamentally
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contingent nature of history and “unmask” all metaphysical identities as
false in the name of a noncenter that continually displaces and fractures. Thus
Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason does not explicitly contradict
itself, as Lohmann claims; rather, it erects an antimetaphysics grounded in
the transhistorical truth of nonidentity, which is, in the end, just another meta-
physics, but in this case a metaphysics of nonidentity.
That nonidentity thinking now serves as the noncenter in a centrifugal
metaphysics for Horkheimer is revealed both in his characterization of identity
thinking and in his claims about the new tasks of philosophy. Because Hork-
heimer considers nonidentity true—or rather, because it comes to serve as a
transhistorical absolute—he falls into designating identity thinking as false,
the division between the abstract ego and nature as the site of an illusion, and
the forms of domination at work in the twentieth century as the result of an
error that can be corrected only by returning to the truth, that is, to nonidentity
thinking. Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason, as it is elaborated in
Eclipse of Reason, comes to function in the exact same manner as the form of
metaphysical critique he had earlier rejected under the banner of an interdisci-
plinarymaterialism, since hemakes the perilousmove toground absolutely his
critique of instrumental reason in the transhistorical truth of nonidentity think-
ing, and on this basis to denounce instrumental reason as an aberration and its
consequences for humanity as barbarous. Thus we find Horkheimer moving
beyond a merely “programmatic” critique of instrumental reason and instead
attempting to establish the legitimacy of his critique by resting it on a metaphys-
ical foundation. One might say, quite simply, that Horkheimer’s critique recon-
structed the dogmatic philosophy of history and theoretical ossification that he
had early on sought to avoid. Consequently, the only tasks of which Horkheimer
can conceive for his newcentrifugal metaphysics aremerely destructive and neg-
ative. Besides maintaining the now vague hope of alleviating the suffering of
individuals in contemporary society, Horkheimer can envision no greater aims
than dismantling all false absolutes and persevering in the vigilance against
advancing any himself—what ultimately amounts to a totalizing, pessimistic
philosophy. In the end, Horkheimer managed to fashion onemore transhistorical
absolute—an empty center intowhich nothing is to be placed—in the attempt to
undermine all absolutes, and for this reason succeeded in reestablishing what he
had fought his entire life to avoid: the tyranny of dogmatic metaphysics. But, in
this case, it is the tyranny of an antimetaphysics committed to uprooting every
identity in the name of the nonidentical at the heart of reason.
Ultimately, Lohmann’s sense that a metaphysical tone is at work in
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demonstrated, the situation is more nuanced, and even more significant, than
Lohmann presents it. The tone should be characterized more accurately as
antimetaphysical than metaphysical. The significance of this difference is
worth noting, since it brings into relief the perils that lie in wait for any cri-
tique of metaphysics that aims to secure absolutely its own foundation. Posi-
tions that bring the metaphysical form of critique to bear on metaphysics in
an attempt to refute metaphysics establish themselves as antimetaphysical
positions, and in doing so—in bringing the tools of metaphysics to bear on
metaphysics—transmogrify into variants of metaphysics, since, like meta-
physics, they attempt to procure the certainty of their own critiques at the
cost of declaring the universal and transhistorical certainty of their own posi-
tion, which generally functions to sanction the exclusion of any position that
dissents from its own. And, as discussed above, it was this element of meta-
physics to which Horkheimer most objected as a form of domination—that
is, he thought metaphysics served as an instrument of coercion. Yet, despite
his awareness of the dominating tendencies lurking in metaphysics and his
objection to it, Horkheimer’s later critique of instrumental reason veers into
establishing an antimetaphysical position, since it elaborates a transhistorical
form of nonidentity thinking as the legitimate basis on which to justify its
indictment of identity thinking and metaphysics, which mires him in the
totalizing, dominating, and oppressive forms of thought that he sought to
obviate. In other words, Horkheimer’s “re-philosophizing” of his interdisci-
plinary materialism through the construction of a transhistorical concept of
nonidentity thinking reshapes his once open dialectic into another closed and
totalizing system.32 However, this turn to an antimetaphysics in his later work
calls attention to how significant Horkheimer’s earlier work elaborating an
interdisciplinary materialism is for pointing the way forward for developing
viable postmetaphysical philosophies that stand as genuine alternatives to
metaphysics rather than as antimetaphysical positions that stumble into the
pitfall of becoming refutations of metaphysics.
Conclusion
Early in his career Horkheimer wasvigilant in casting his interdisciplinarymate-
rialism as a methodological alternative to metaphysical philosophy that, impor-
tantly, evades the equally perilous absurdities of academic skepticism and relativ-
32. See Dubiel, Theory and Politics, 103–7. I would like to thank the reviewer for drawing my
attention to this specific characterization of the Frankfurt School’s work in the late 1930s and the
1940s by Dubiel.
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ism. Thiswas all the more impressively demonstrated in Horkheimer’s refusal to
provide a metaphysical foundation for the normative orientation of his interdis-
ciplinary materialism, especially given the overwhelmingly powerful impetus
one experiences inwanting to do so. One of the single greatest contributions of
Horkheimer’s work to critical social theory is the rigor and sophistication with
which he demonstrated that his interdisciplinary materialism as a postmeta-
physical philosophy can serve as a coherent method for addressing the sociopo-
litical issues of our time. His emphasis on alternative forms of thought and sub-
jectivity, aswell as alternativeways of relating to others and theworld, still stand
as significant ideals for our time. Horkheimer’s work developing a viable post-
metaphysical critical social theory offers a considerable theoretical resource for
those looking to engage in philosophy outside the bounds of metaphysics.
George W. Shea, IV is assistant professor of philosophy at Misericordia University.
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